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Abstract
We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of
an external patent holder to ¯rms in a general Cournot market. Our results are
as follows: When the number of ¯rms is large, the bargaining set for each per-
missible coalition structure suggests that the patent holder should extract the
entire pro¯ts of all licensees. The outcome that the bargaining ¯nally reaches
exactly coincides with the non-cooperative outcome, and it cannot be improved
upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Thus, it is strongly stable.
The fair allocation represented by the Aumann-Drµeze value is, however, not
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1 Introduction: licensing and bargaining
We study asymptotic bargaining outcomes in licensing a patented technology of an
external patent holder to ¯rms in a general Cournot market. Our aim is to compare
the bargaining outcomes with non-cooperative outcomes in the same situation tra-
ditionally studied in the literature, to consider how stable the bargaining outcomes
are, and to examine whether or not the fair allocation can be realized as the stable
bargaining outcomes, as the number of ¯rms tends to in¯nity.
Patent licensing problems in oligopolistic markets have been investigated mainly
through non-cooperative mechanisms; (¯xed license) fee or (per-unit) royalty in
Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986), and auction in Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986).1
Many subsequent papers studied the optimal licensing mechanisms that maximize
the patent holder's revenue. For example, among the above three non-cooperative
mechanisms, Kamien et al. (1992, hereafter KOT) showed that in a Cournot market
for a homogeneous good it is never optimal for an external patent holder to license
his patented cost-reducing technology by means of royalty only. Muto (1993) found
that in a Bertrand duopoly with di®erentiated goods there are cases where it is
optimal for an external patent holder to license by means of royalty only.2
Licensing agreements are, on the other hand, contract terms signed by the patent
holders and licensees resulting from bargaining. From this viewpoint, Tauman and
Watanabe (2007) gave a cooperative interpretation of the payo® for an external
patent holder: As the number of ¯rms tends to in¯nity, the Shapley value of the
patent holder, which measures his fair contribution to the total industry pro¯t,
approximates the payo® he obtains in the non-cooperative patent licensing games
traditionally studied in the above literature. Jelnov and Tauman (2009) recon¯rmed
this result in another setup. Their analyses were, however, limited to payo® distri-
butions of the monopoly pro¯t. (i.e., all ¯rms are licensed, and they form a cartel
to coordinate their production level and market behavior.) In practice, monopoly
is prohibited by the anti-trust law, and thus many papers in the literature do not
allow ¯rms to form a cartel both in production and in the market. Accordingly, the
asymptotic equivalence they obtained is biased; thus it should be reconsidered.
1Katz and Shapiro analyzed games composed of an R&D stage followed by a licensing stage.
The patent licensing problems typically do not address the R&D stage.
2For licensing a new product, Kamien et al. (1988) studied the optimal license fees, and Erutku
and Richelle (2006) provided the optimal non-linear contracts that speci¯es a ¯xed upfront fee and
a royalty. For licensing a cost-reducing innovation, Erutku and Richelle (2007) extended Kamien-
Tauman model (1986) and provided the optimal non-linear contracts, and Sen and Tauman (2007)
found the optimal combination of licensing schemes in which the upfront fee is determined by auction
and royalty is determined by the patent holder. Stamatopoulos and Tauman (2008) considered a
quality-improving innovation in a price-setting duopoly with the logit demand function.
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Prohibiting ¯rms from forming such a cartel, Watanabe and Muto (2008) in-
vestigated licensing agreements reached as bargaining outcomes. To consider the
number of licensees that bene¯ts an external patent holder most through bargain-
ing, they used bargaining solutions for games with coalition structures where no side
payments among coalitions are allowed as in Aumann and Drµeze (1974). Watanabe-
Muto model intends to deal with bargaining as a licensing policy other than non-
cooperative mechanisms in a situation traditionally studied in the literature.
This paper is, in part, an outgrowth of Watanabe and Muto (2008). Their main
result is that if the number of licensees that maximizes licensees' total surplus is
greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set
for a coalition structure is a singleton. In this case, the optimal number of licensees
from the viewpoint of the patent holder's revenue maximization is also uniquely
determined. When this condition is not satis¯ed, however, the patent holder cannot
determine the optimal number of licensees, because each symmetric bargaining set
for a coalition structure is not necessarily a singleton. This paper red solves this
problem in the case where the number of ¯rms tends to in¯nity, and shows an
asymptotic equivalence of a bargaining outcome to the non-cooperative one.
Our asymptotic results in a general Cournot market are as follows: (I) When
the number of ¯rms is large, the bargaining set for each permissible coalition struc-
ture suggests that the patent holder should extract the entire pro¯ts of all licensees.
Moreover, the outcome that the bargaining ¯nally reaches exactly coincides with the
non-cooperative outcome derived by KOT. (II) The ¯nal bargaining outcome men-
tioned in (I) cannot be improved upon by any objections even if those objections
entail almost zero cost, so it is strongly stable. (III) The fair allocation represented
by the Aumann-Drµeze value (an extension of the Shapley value to games with coali-
tion structures) cannot be realized as such a stable bargaining outcome in our patent
licensing game.
This paper shows as a minor result that, for every coalition structure, the core is
empty in a general Cournot market. The core requires that there be no objection to a
bargaining outcome.3 This stability condition may be satis¯ed, when the objections
entail some positive amounts of cost. Thus, in this paper, we say that a bargaining
outcome is strongly stable when it is not improved upon by any objections with
almost zero cost. On the other hand, the bargaining set for a coalition structure is
always non-empty, which requires a weaker stability condition that there be a counter
objection for every objection to a bargaining outcome. Throughout this paper, a
stable bargaining outcome refers to the bargaining set for a coalition structure.
3Watanabe and Muto (2008) noted that, for every coalition structure, the core is empty in the
linear Cournot market.
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A key issue is how to de¯ne the characteristic function, i.e., the worth of a coali-
tion of players (a patent holder and ¯rms). In negotiations for licensees' payments
to the patent holder, the worth of a coalition that forms to make an objection mea-
sures the power of the objection. It also measures the power of a counter objection.
Tauman and Watanabe (2007) and Jelnov and Tauman (2009) assumed that when
some players form a coalition deviating from the grand coalition, all the other players
form the complementary coalition.4 coalition can decide which ¯rms in the coalition
to activate (operate) and which ¯rms to shut down, but (2) the non-active ¯rms
can share the total pro¯t of the coalition through side payments; the side payments
are made in reward for the non-active ¯rms' cooperation to enhance the coalitional
e±ciency by softening the market competition. Thus, the grand coalition can work
as a \monopolist" both in production and in the market. Under this setup, however,
the asymptotic equivalence does not hold for the ¯rms' pro¯ts.
Further, if ¯rms in a coalition with the patent holder were to be shut down on
an occasion for patent licensing, then those ¯rms would incur disadvantage when
another technology was newly invented, because they would not have the old one.
In many practices, moreover, the new technology is not usable without the old one,
because the patented technologies are, in reality, invented cumulatively one after
another. This is another reason why we did not allow ¯rms to form a cartel both in
production and in the market, as in Watanabe and Muto (2008).
Driessen et al. (1992) applied another de¯nition to an information trading game,
not allowing ¯rms either to shut-down their operations or to form cartels in the
market. According to their de¯nition, however, information (e.g., a patented tech-
nology) is not necessarily licensed to all potential buyers in a coalition for trading
information, whereas the non-buyers in the coalition share the total pro¯t of the
coalition for e±cient information sharing. So, against cumulative innovations, their
de¯nition has the same problem as in the above two papers.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 builds
up our patent licensing game. Section 3 de¯nes solutions applied to our game and
shows our results. In three separate subsections, we investigate the characteristics
of the stable bargaining outcomes described by the bargaining set for a coalition
structure, comparing them with non-cooperative outcomes, considering how stable
they are, and examining whether or not fair allocations are contained in the stable
bargaining outcomes. Section 4 brie°y refers to a property of our characteristic
function and other related non-cooperative works.
4Jelnov and Tauman (2009) noted that the same asymptotic result can be regained also in the
case where the complementary coalition is partitoned into some coalitions. These two papers further
presumed that (1) each
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2 A patent licensing game
We begin this section by describing the outline of our model, and then give a speci-
¯cation of bargaining in the model.
2.1 The outline
Consider a Cournot market with the set Nn = f1; : : : ; ng of identical ¯rms, where
2 · n <1. Each ¯rm i 2 Nn produces qi (¸ 0) units of a homogeneous good with
the constant unit cost c (> 0) of production. Let q =
P
i2Nn qi denote the total
production level in the market. Each ¯rm faces a downward sloping inverse demand
function P (q), where P (0) > c. Assume the following conditions on the demand
function, according to KOT,
A1: The total revenue function qP (q) is strictly concave in q.
A2: The demand function Q(p) is decreasing, di®erentiable for p > 0, and the price
elasticity ´(p) = ¡pQ0=Q (where Q0 = dQ=dp) is a non-decreasing function of p.
An agent, who is not a producer, has a patent of a new technology that reduces
the unit cost of production from c to c ¡ ", where 0 < " < c. This agent is called
an external patent holder, and is denoted by player 0. Thus, the set of players of
this game is f0g [Nn. The pro¯t of ¯rm i is (P (q)¡ c+ ")qi if it has access to the
patented technology (licensee), and (P (q)¡c)qi if it has no access to that technology
(non-licensee). The external patent holder gains the revenue in return for licensing
its patented technology to ¯rms. Otherwise it gains nothing. According to the
traditional literature, we assume that the patent is perfectly protected, namely no
¯rm can use the patented technology without the patent holder's permission.5
The game has three stages. At stage (i), the patent holder selects a subset
Sn µ Nn and invites the ¯rms in Sn to negotiate on license issues. No ¯rm in
Nn n Sn can participate in that negotiation, so they are not licensed. At stage (ii),
every ¯rm in Sn negotiates with the patent holder over how much it should pay to
the patent holder. It is assumed that all the ¯rms in Sn that were invited to bargain
will buy a license, thus focusing solely on the fees paid to the licensor.6 All players
in f0g [ Sn (the patent holder and licensees) can communicate within f0g [ Sn.
Firms in Nn n Sn (non-licensees) are not allowed to communicate with any players,
5So, there is neither piracy nor resale of the patented technology to non-licensees. Muto (1987)
considered patent licensing under a resale-free situation. Muto (1990) and Nakayama and Quintas
(1991) investigated resale-proof trades of information which is related to our patent licensing game.
6Even if ¯rms in Sn could choose whether or not to buy the license, we would retain the same
propositions due to the solution concepts we apply to this model.
5
because they do not take part in the negotiation; thus, they cannot observe how
the negotiations run. The payment to the patent holder is made before the next
stage. At stage (iii), ¯rms compete µa la Cournot (i.e., in quantities) in the market,
knowing which ¯rms are licensed or not. Firms are prohibited from forming a cartel
to coordinate their production level and market behavior. This is the assumption
under which we consider the same situation as in the literature, to compare the
bargaining outcomes with the non-cooperative outcomes.
Remark 1. At stage (ii), a conference might be held by all members of f0g[Sn, or
the patent holder might negotiate with each ¯rm in Sn on a one-by-one basis. More
important is that players in f0g [ Sn can communicate among themselves. This is
a di®erence from the traditional non-cooperative patent licensing games.
2.2 Bargaining under a coalition structure
In Section 3, we analyze this model backwardly in the spirit of subgame perfection.
Before that, we give a speci¯cation to stage (ii). Let us begin with stage (iii). Let
tn = jTnj for each Tn µ Nn. When tn ¯rms are licensed, let W (tn) and L(tn)
denote the Cournot equilibrium pro¯ts of each licensee and each non-licensee at
stage (iii), respectively.7 Because ´(p) is assumed by A2 to be non-decreasing in
p, these equilibrium pro¯ts and the equilibrium price are uniquely determined for
any tn such that 0 · tn · n. Let K ´ c=("´(c)). We assume K > 1, i.e., non-
drastic innovations.8 In general, K is not an integer, but for simplicity we treat it
as an integer, according to the literature.9 KOT showed that for any tn such that
0 · tn · n the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(tn) decreases in tn and p(K) = c,
and that W (tn) and L(tn) are as follows:
W (tn) =
8<:¡
(p¡c+")2
P 0 if 1 · tn · K;
(p¡c+")Q(p)
tn
if K · tn · n;
(1)
and
L(tn) =
8<:¡
(p¡c)2
P 0 ; if 0 · tn · K;
0 if K · tn · n¡ 1;
(2)
7To be more accurately, the Cournot equilibrium pro¯ts of each licensee and each non-licensee
are functions of n as well, i.e., Wn(¢) and Ln(¢), respectively. Throughout this paper, for notational
ease, we denote them by W (¢) and L(¢), when there are n ¯rms in the market.
8Otherwise the monopoly price under the new technology is less than the competitive price under
the old technology. In this case, the patent holder can extract the monopoly pro¯t by licensing his
patented technology to only one ¯rm, so the patent licensing problem becomes trivial.
9Sen (2005) is the exception for this assumption.
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where P 0 = dP=dq < 0. For any tn such that 0 · tn · n, W (tn) decreases in tn,
while L(tn) decreases in tn if 0 · tn < K. Thus, the Cournot equilibrium pro¯ts
are summarized in the following order:
W (1) > ¢ ¢ ¢ > W (tn) > ¢ ¢ ¢ > W (n) > L(0) > ¢ ¢ ¢
> L(tn) > ¢ ¢ ¢ > L(K) = ¢ ¢ ¢ = L(n¡ 1) = 0: (3)
Given these equilibrium pro¯ts are determined at stage (iii), we next formalize
the bargaining at stage (ii) as a (cooperative) bargaining game with a coalition
structure. Any non-empty subset of f0g[Nn is called a coalition. At stage (ii), the
¯rms that do not belong to Sn cannot participate in the negotiations on licensing
issues, but play a relevant role in determining the outside options of negotiators in
f0g[Sn. Therefore, for any coalition, we need to provide the worth of the coalition,
which is the pro¯t level that the players that belong to the coalition can guarantee for
themselves in the worst anticipation because each player in f0g [ Sn should claim
the credible outside options in the negotiation process. The worth of a coalition
T 0n µ f0g [ Nn is represented by v(T 0n), which is generally called the characteristic
function. As described above, every ¯rm in coalition f0g [ Sn is licensed at stage
(ii), and ¯rms are not allowed to form a cartel both in production and in the market
at stage (iii). So, the worth of each coalition is de¯ned as the sum of the Cournot
equilibrium pro¯ts of the players in the coalition.10 Thus, the characteristic function
v : 2f0g[Nn ! R is given by
v(f0g) = v(;) = 0; v(f0g [ Tn) = tnW (tn) and v(Tn) = tnL(n¡ tn):
The patent holder can gain nothing without licensing his patented technology be-
cause he is not a producer; thus v(f0g) = 0. The total Cournot equilibrium pro¯t of
licensees in Tn is tnW (tn); thus v(f0g [ Tn) = tnW (tn). v(Tn) is the total Cournot
equilibrium pro¯t that ¯rms in Tn can guarantee for themselves in the worst antici-
pation when ¯rms in Tn jointly break o® the negotiation. It is the worst case in our
model that all the other n ¡ tn ¯rms are licensed, because of (3). We assume the
worst case for coalition Tn in the spirit of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944);
thus, v(Tn) = tnL(n¡ tn).11
For a non-empty set Sn µ Nn of licensees determined at stage (i), the permissible
coalition structure is denoted by PSn = ff0g [ Sn; ffiggi2NnnSng, because players
in f0g [ Sn can communicate with one another but non-licensees are not allowed to
communicate with any players. (All ¯rms behave independently in the market at
10Recall the detail discussions in Section 1.
11The worth v(Tn) of a coalition Tn is de¯ned from a pessimistic viewpoint. This de¯nition plays
no important role to obtain our propositions.
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stage (iii).) Let sn = jSnj. The set of imputations under the coalition structure PSn
is de¯ned as
ISn = fxn = (xn0 ; xn1 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; xnn) 2 Rn+1jxn0 +
P
i2Sn x
n
i = snW (sn);
xn0 ¸ 0; xni ¸ L(n¡ 1) 8i 2 Sn; and xni = L(sn) 8i 2 Nn n Sng:
Players in f0g [ Sn divide the total Cournot equilibrium pro¯t of licensees, each
i 2 f0g [ Sn being guaranteed the worst payo® v(fig). Each of non-licensees in
NnnSn obtains the equilibrium pro¯t L(sn), because sn ¯rms are licensed. Let (f0g[
Nn; v; P
Sn) denote a (cooperative) bargaining game with the coalition structure PSn .
Every vector of payo®s for players should be in ISn . (This requirement is slightly
weakened in Subsection 3.2.) The solutions for this game are de¯ned and derived
within subsections in Section 3. We consider only a subset Sn of licensees with
Sn 6= ;, because the patent holder can guarantee the payo® zero by itself.
3 Asymptotic bargaining outcomes
In this section, for a coalition structure given at stage (i), we consider the bargaining
set, the least core, and the Aumann-Drµeze value as solutions that predict bargaining
outcomes at stage (ii). Let Tn µ Nn. For each coalition, the number of its elements
is an integer. So, a sequence of jTnj is said to converge to an integer t (written as
limn!1 jTnj = t) if there exists n0 such that for all n > n0, we have jTnj = t. Note
that jTnj · n, but jTnj may tend to in¯nity as n tends to in¯nity. In this paper,
we con¯ne our consideration to sequences of coalitions whose number of elements
converges or diverges.12
We ¯rst shows the existence of the limits of v(f0g[Tn)(= tnW (tn)) and v(Tn)(=
tnL(n ¡ tn)) for each Tn µ Nn in the following lemma, which is used to prove our
propositions. This is a variant of the Cournot limit theorem: As the number of ¯rms
in the Cournot market increases in¯nitely, the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(tn)
falls to non-licensees' unit cost c of production or less. The formal proof is shown
in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Let t ´ limn!1 tn. In the Cournot market, the following four statements
hold: (a) If t · K, then limn!1 tnW (tn) = t ¢ "Q(c)=K. (b) If t > K, then
limn!1 tnW (tn) = (c ¡ ")Q(p)=(t´(p) ¡ 1), where p = p(t). (c) If tn diverges,
then limn!1 tnW (tn) = 0. (d) Regardless of whether tn converges or diverges,
limn!1 tnL(n¡ tn) = 0.
12In addition to this restriction, we implicitly assume the following things: When a sequence of
jTnj converges, if i 2 Tn for some n > n0, then i 2 Tn+1. When it diverges, the player that belongs
to some coalition in the sequence always belongs to the coalition in the limit.
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3.1 The bargaining set for a coalition structure
When the solution is empty at stage (ii), we cannot answer our question on how
many licenses the patent holder should sell to ¯rms through negotiations. In a more
general patent licensing game than ours, Watanabe and Muto (2008) showed that the
core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition f0g [ Nn
forms. On the other hand, the bargaining set for a coalition structure is always
non-empty, which was shown by Davis and Maschler (1967) and Peleg (1967).13
Let us begin with de¯ning the relevant notions. Let i; j 2 f0g[Sn and xn 2 ISn .
We say that i has an objection (yn; Tn) against j at xn if i 2 Tn; j =2 Tn; Tn µ
f0g [Nn; ynk > xnk for any k 2 Tn, and
P
k2Tn y
n
k · v(Tn), and that j has a counter
objection (zn; Rn) to i's objection (yn; Tn) if j 2 Rn; i =2 Rn; Rn µ f0g[Nn; znk ¸ xnk
for any k 2 Rn; znk ¸ ynk for any k 2 Rn \ Tn, and
P
k2Rn z
n
k · v(Rn). We say
that i has a valid objection (yn; Tn) at xn if there exists no counter objection to i's
objection (yn; Tn). The bargaining set for a coalition structure PSn is de¯ned as
MSn = fxn 2 ISn jno player in f0g [ Sn has a valid objection at xng:
We simply call MNn the bargaining set.
Remark 2. When each player in f0g[Sn makes his objection (or counter objection)
at stage (ii), he makes it against another player via coalition Tn (or Rn) that does
not actually form, because coalition f0g [ Sn eventually forms. Note that forming
a coalition at stage (ii) does never imply cooperation either in production or in the
market among players in the coalition.
Our ¯rst proposition suggests that when the number of ¯rms is in¯nitely large,
the patent holder should extract the entire pro¯ts of all licensees in the bargaining
set for a permissible coalition structure except the grand coalition. We refer to the
case of the grand coalition in the next subsection. The following result is due to the
fact that it is harder for each ¯rm in Sn to make objections and counter objections
against the patent holder as the number of ¯rms becomes in¯nitely large.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Sn ( Nn. Take any xn 2MSn. Then, in the Cournot
market, limn!1 xn0 = limn!1 snW (sn) and limn!1 xni = 0 for all i 6= 0.
Proof. Take any xn 2MSn with Sn 6= Nn. First, we show that limn!1
P
i2Nn x
n
i =
0. Consider the following two cases. Case (i): Suppose that there exist i0 2 Sn
such that xni0 > L(sn). Order all the n ¯rms according to their pro¯ts in the non-
decreasing order, and take the ¯rst sn ¯rms. Let Tn be the set of the ¯rst sn ¯rms.
13Some concepts of bargaining set for a coalition structure were provided in Aumann and Maschler
(1964) as an earlier publication, but their non-emptiness was not shown there.
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Note that xnj = L(sn) for j 2 Nn n Sn because xn 2 ISn . Then, the patent holder
has an objection(yn; f0g [ Tn) against i0 because xn0 +
P
i2Tn x
n
i < x
n
0 +
P
i2Sn x
n
i =
snW (sn). But, i0 can have a counter objection (zn; Nn) because xn 2 MSn . Thus,
0 · Pi2Nn xni · Pi2Nn zni · nL(0) = v(Nn). (0 · xni for all i 2 Nn, by (3) and
xn 2 ISn .) By Lemma 1 (d) and the squeeze theorem, limn!1
P
i2Nn x
n
i = 0.
Case (ii): Suppose that xni · L(sn) for all i 2 Sn. Then, i has an objection (yn; Nn)
against the patent holder, because
P
i2Nn x
n
i =
P
i2Sn x
n
i +(n¡sn)L(sn) · nL(sn) <
nL(0). Note that 0 · Pi2Nn xni · nL(0). Thus, by Lemma 1 (d) and the squeeze
theorem, limn!1
P
i2Nn x
n
i = 0.
Next, we complete the proof. Because limn!1
P
i2Nn x
n
i = 0 and x
n
i ¸ 0 for
all i 2 Nn, limn!1 xni = 0. And, limn!1
P
i2Sn x
n
i = 0 because 0 ·
P
i2Sn x
n
i ·P
i2Nn x
n
i . By the de¯nition of I
Sn , xn0 = snW (sn)¡
P
i2Sn x
n
i . Therefore,
lim
n!1x
n
0 = limn!1
Ã
snW (sn)¡
X
i2Sn
xni
!
= lim
n!1 snW (sn):
Watanabe and Muto (2008) showed that the symmetric bargaining set for a
coalition structure is a singleton under a certain condition. Proposition 1 shows
that when the number of ¯rms increases in¯nitely in the Cournot market, the patent
holder's pro¯t realized by the bargaining set for a coalition structure is uniquely
determined, regardless of whether there are symmetric or asymmetric payo®s for
the licensees, unless the grand coalition forms. We refer to the case of the grand
coalition, i.e., MNn , as a corollary in Subsection 3.2. (We can extend Proposition 1
to Sn = Nn.)
Let us now consider the optimal number of licensees to be selected at stage (i).
The next lemma suggests the answer; sn = K when the number of ¯rms is in¯nitely
large. So, there is no need for referring to the bargaining set MNn . The intuition
is that all non-licensees are driven out of the market when K or more ¯rms are
licensed, and the Cournot equilibrium price goes down as the number of licensees
increases, so the competition among licensees in the market results in the reduction
of the total Cournot equilibrium pro¯t snW (sn). The formal proof is shown in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2. Let s0n be such that s0nW (s0n) ¸ snW (sn) for sn = 1; : : : ; n. Then,
limn!1 s0n = K.
By this lemma, we can show the next proposition which suggests that when the
number n of ¯rms becomes in¯nitely large, the patent holder can gain the maximum
10
pro¯t "Q(c) as a stable bargaining outcome by licensing his patented technology to
K ¯rms.
Proposition 2. Take any x^n 2MSn with limn!1 jSnj = K. Then, in the Cournot
market, limn!1 x^n0 = "Q(c) ¸ limn!1 snW (sn) for any sn.
Proof. Suppose Sn ( Nn. By Proposition 1, for any xn 2 MSn , limn!1 xn0 =
limn!1 snW (sn). Lemma 2 suggests that the number of licensees that maximizes
snW (sn) converges toK as the number of ¯rms increases in¯nitely. Thus, by Lemma
1 (a), for any Sn ( Nn with limn!1 jSnj = K, the patent holder obtains
lim
n!1 x^
n
0 =
³
lim
n!1 jSnj
´
¢ "Q(c)
K
= "Q(c):
Among three non-cooperative mechanisms such as ¯xed license fee, per-unit roy-
alty and auction, KOT showed that if the magnitude " of innovation is not too
small, then it is optimal for the patent holder to auction o® K licenses, otherwise
it is optimal to sell K licenses to ¯rms by means of a ¯xed license fee. Eventu-
ally, when the Cournot industry size increases inde¯nitely, the market price drops
to c, non-licensees exit the market, and the patent holder extracts the entire indus-
try pro¯t "Q(c).14 Proposition 2 implies that the bargaining outcome obtained by
applying the bargaining set for a coalition structure exactly coincides with the non-
cooperative outcome. In other words, the non-cooperative outcome can be reached
through negotiations as the stable bargaining outcome when the Cournot market is
very large (i.e., the number of ¯rms is in¯nitely large).
3.2 The least core for a coalition structure
In this subsection, we consider the least core for a coalition structure, in order
to provide a stronger meaning for the result on the bargaining set suggested by
Proposition 2, by investigating the relationship between these two solutions.
To de¯ne the least core, we begin with de¯ning the ²-core for a coalition structure
PSn , which is given for any ² 2 R as
CSn² = fxn 2 ISnp j
P
i2Tn x
n
i ¸ v(Tn)¡ ²;
8Tn µ f0g [Nn with Tn \ (f0g [ Sn) 6= ; and Tn 6= f0g [ Sng;
where ISnp = fxn 2 Rn+1jxn0 +
P
i2Sn x
n
i = snW (sn) and x
n
i = L(sn) 8i 2 Nn n Sng.
ISnp is called the set of pre-imputations for a coalition structure P
Sn . The real
14Kamien and Tauman (1984) showed that "Q(c) is also the patent holder's asymptotic payo® if
he chooses to charge every licensee a pre-announced per-unit royalty.
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number ² is interpreted as the cost that is needed to form an objecting coalition Tn.
Evidently, CSn² 6= ; if ² is large enough, so we can apply this solution to stage (ii)
to ¯nd bargaining outcomes. When ² = 0, CSn² is simply called the core C
Sn for a
coalition structure PSn . Clearly, CSn²0 µ CSn² whenever ²0 < ², with strict inclusion
if CSn² 6= ;. The least core for a coalition structure PSn is de¯ned as
LCSn =
T
²C
Sn
² where C
Sn
² 6= ;:
Let ²0 be the smallest ² such that CSn² 6= ;, that is,
²0 = min
x2ISnp
max
Tnµf0g[Nn:Tn\(f0g[Sn) 6=;; Tn 6=f0g[Sn
Ã
v(Tn)¡
X
i2Tn
xi
!
:
It is known that LCSn = CSn²0 .
Let s¤n denote the number of licensees that maximizes their total surplus, i.e.,
s¤n(W (s¤n)¡L(0)) ¸ sn(W (sn)¡L(0)) for any sn = 1; : : : ; n. This number plays an
important role in this subsection, whose properties are shown in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. In the Cournot market, the following properties on s¤n hold: (a) s¤n · K.
(b) limn!1 s¤n = K.
Proof. (a). We ¯rst show that, for any tn such that tn ¸ K, v(f0g [ Tn) decreases
in tn. v(f0g [ Tn) = tnW (tn) = (p ¡ c + ")Q(p), where p = p(tn) is the Cournot
equilibrium price when tn ¯rms are licensed, so
@v(f0g [ Tn)
@tn
=
@p
@tn
¡
Q(p) + (p¡ c+ ")Q0¢ = Q(p) ¢ @p
@tn
µ
1¡ ´(p)
p
(p¡ c+ ")
¶
:
By a general property of the Cournot equilibrium price that tn(p¡ c) = p=´(p)¡ tn"
if tn ¸ K ´ c=("´(c)) (See, e.g., KOT),
1¡ 1
´(p)
< 1¡ 1
tn´(p)
=
c¡ "
p
;
which implies that 1 > ´(p)(p¡ c+ ")=p. As noted in Subsection 2.2, KOT showed
that, for any tn = 1; : : : ; n, p(tn) decreases in tn. Thus, @v(f0g [ Tn)=@tn < 0.
Let us now give the proof of (a). Suppose that there exists s¤n with s¤n > K. By
the de¯nition of s¤n, s¤n(W (s¤n)¡ L(0)) ¸ K(W (K)¡ L(0)), i.e.,
s¤nW (s
¤
n)¡KW (K) ¸ (s¤n ¡K)L(0): (4)
As shown above, for each tn with tn ¸ K, v(f0g[Tn) decreases in tn, so the left-hand
side of (4) is negative. The right-hand side is, however, positive by the supposition
s¤n > K and (3). This contradiction implies s¤n · K.
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(b). Note ¯rst that, by Lemma 3 (a), s¤n · K. By Lemma 1 (d), for any
sn such that sn · K · n, limn!1 snL(0) = 0, so limn!1 sn(W (sn) ¡ L(0)) =
limn!1 snW (sn). By Lemma 2, the number of licensees that maximizes snW (sn)
becomes K as the number of ¯rms increases in¯nitely. Thus, limn!1 s¤n = K.
We here brie°y refer to MNn . Assuming the same payo®s for all licensees,
Watanabe and Muto (2008) showed in their Proposition 4 (a) that if n > s¤n, then
n(W (n)¡L(0)) · xn0 · s¤n(W (s¤n)¡L(0)), where xn 2MNn . Lemma 3 (a) suggests
that n > s¤n holds for su±ciently large n. By Lemma 1 (d), limn!1 nL(0) = 0.
Thus, if xn 2 MNn , then limn!1 nW (n) · limn!1 xn0 . On the other hand, xn0 ·
nW (n) = v(f0g [Nn). Therefore, if xn0 2 MNn , then limn!1 xn0 = limn!1 nW (n)
and limn!1 xni = 0 for all i 6= 0, by the squeeze theorem.
Corollary 1. Take any xn 2 MNn. Then, in the Cournot market, limn!1 xn0 =
limn!1 nW (n) and limn!1 xni = 0 for all i 6= 0.
Before proceeding to the least core, con¯rm that the core CSn is empty for any
permissible coalition structure in our model. This is the reason why we chose the
bargaining set for a coalition structure as our solution.
Proposition 3. In the Cournot market, if n > K, then CSn = ; for any Sn µ Nn.
Proof. Without specifying the market structure, Watanabe and Muto (2008) showed
in their Propositions 1 and 2 that CSn = ; if Sn 6= Nn, and that CNn 6= ; if and
only if s¤n = n. In the Cournot market, by Lemma 3 (a), s¤n 6= n if n > K. Thus,
CSn = ; for any permissible coalition structure.
We now proceed to the relationship between the least core and the bargaining
set for a coalition structure. Let us begin with showing the next lemma.
Lemma 4. Let S¤n µ Nn be the set of ¯rms where jS¤nj = s¤n and let ²¤0 be ²0 such
that LCS
¤
n = CS
¤
n
²¤0
. Then, in the Cournot market, limn!1 ²¤0 = +0.15
Proof. By Proposition 3, CS
¤
n = ; if n > K. Thus, ²¤0 ¸ 0 if n > K. We next show
that CS
¤
n
²0 6= ; where ²0 = (n¡ s¤n)(L(0)¡ L(s¤n)) > 0. De¯ne x0n 2 IS
¤
n
p by
x0ni =
8>>><>>>:
s¤n(W (s¤n)¡ L(0)) if i = 0
L(0) if i 2 S¤n
L(s¤n) if i 2 Nn n S¤n:
15The notation limn!1 ²¤0 = +0 is a shorthand for the formal expression that ²
¤
0 > 0, ²
¤
0 ! 0 as
n!1.
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Take any Tn µ f0g[Nn with Tn\(f0g[S¤n) 6= ; and Tn 6= f0g[S¤n. Let tn = jTnnf0gj
and t0n = j(Tn n f0g) \ S¤nj. Then, s¤n + tn ¡ t0n · n. Thus, if 0 2 Tn,P
i2Tn x
0n
i ¡ v(Tn) + ²0
= s¤n(W (s
¤
n)¡ L(0)) + (n¡ s¤n + t0n)L(0)¡ tnW (tn)¡ (n+ t0n ¡ s¤n ¡ tn)L(s¤n)
¸ s¤n(W (s¤n)¡ L(0)) + (n¡ s¤n + t0n)L(0)¡ tnW (tn)¡ (n+ t0n ¡ s¤n ¡ tn)L(0)
= s¤n(W (s
¤
n)¡ L(0))¡ tn(W (tn)¡ L(0)) ¸ 0;
and, if 0 =2 Tn,P
i2Tn x
0n
i ¡ v(Tn) + ²0
= t0nL(0) + (tn ¡ t0n)L(s¤n)¡ tnL(n¡ tn) + (n¡ s¤n)(L(0)¡ L(s¤n))
¸ t0nL(0) + (tn ¡ t0n)L(s¤n)¡ tnL(0) + (n¡ s¤n)(L(0)¡ L(s¤n))
= (n+ t0n ¡ s¤n ¡ tn)(L(0)¡ L(s¤n)) ¸ 0;
which jointly imply x0n 2 CS¤n²0 . Consequently, we have 0 · ²¤0 · (n ¡ s¤n)(L(0) ¡
L(s¤n)) if n > K.
Finally, by Lemma 3 (b) and Lemma 1 (d),
lim
n!1(n¡ s
¤
n)(L(0)¡ L(s¤n)) = limn!1(n¡K)L(0) = 0:
Therefore, by the squeeze theorem, limn!1 ²¤0 = +0.
Applying Lemma 4, we state the relationship between the least core and the
bargaining set as the next proposition.
Proposition 4. Take any x^n 2 MS¤n and any x¤n 2 LCS¤n. Then, in the Cournot
market, limn!1 x^n0 = limn!1 x¤n0 = "Q(c) and limn!1 x^n0 = limn!1 x¤ni = 0 for
all i 6= 0.
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 3 (b), for any x^n 2MS¤n , limn!1 x^n0 =
"Q(c) and limn!1 x^n0 = 0 for all i 6= 0. We ¯rst show that limn!1 x¤n0 = "Q(c)
if x¤n 2 LCS¤n . Take an arbitrary x¤n 2 LCS¤n . Then, Pi2S¤n x¤ni ¸ v(S¤n) ¡ ²¤0 by
LCS
¤
n = CS
¤
n
²¤0
. By the de¯nition of IS
¤
n
p , x¤n0 +
P
i2S¤n x
¤n
i = s
¤
nW (s
¤
n), so
x¤n0 · s¤nW (s¤n)¡ v(S¤n) + ²¤0 = s¤nW (s¤n)¡ s¤nL(n¡ s¤n) + ²¤0:
On the other hand, for any su±ciently large n such that 2K < n, 2s¤n · 2K < n, so
we can take Tn µ Nn n S¤n such that jTnj = jS¤nj. Then, by x¤n 2 CS
¤
n
²¤0
,
x¤n0 ¸ v(f0g [ Tn)¡
X
i2Tn
x¤ni ¡ ²¤0 = s¤nW (s¤n)¡ s¤nL(s¤n)¡ ²¤0:
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Accordingly, by Lemmas 1 (a), (d), 3 (b) and 4 and by the squeeze theorem,
lim
n!1x
¤n
0 = limn!1 s
¤
nW (s
¤
n) =
³
lim
n!1 s
¤
n
´
¢ "Q(c)
K
= "Q(c);
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Next, we show that limn!1 x¤ni = 0 for each licensee i 2 S¤n. As shown above,
limn!1 x¤n0 = limn!1 s¤nW (s¤n). Thus, limn!1
P
i2S¤n x
¤n
i = limn!1(s
¤
nW (s
¤
n) ¡
x¤n0 ) = 0. On the other hand, x¤ni ¸ L(n ¡ 1) ¡ ²¤0 by x¤n 2 CS
¤
n
²¤0
. Accordingly, by
Lemmas 1 (d) and 4, limn!1 x¤ni = 0 for each licensee i 2 S¤n.
Lastly, for any non-licensee i 2 Nn n S¤n, limn!1 x¤ni = limn!1 L(s¤n) = 0 by
Lemma 3 (b) and (3).
For a given coalition structure, the least core LCSn is the subset of ISnp that
cannot be improved upon by any objections even if those objections entail a cost of
at least ²0. In this sense, the bargaining outcomes are strongly stable if they are in
the least core with very small ² (nearly or less than zero). Proposition 4 together
with Proposition 2 jointly suggest that when the number of ¯rms increases in¯nitely
in the Cournot market, the bargaining outcome obtained by the bargaining set for
a coalition structure PS
¤
n , where the patent holder can gain the maximum pro¯t,
cannot be improved upon even by any objections with almost zero cost. Therefore,
we can say that the bargaining outcome that the patent holder gains the maximum
pro¯t "Q(c) is strongly stable, when the Cournot market is very large.
3.3 The Aumann-Drµeze value
It is well known that the Shapley value is not necessarily in the core, but its rela-
tionship with the bargaining set has not been studied comprehensively. The Shapley
value is frequently interpreted as a fair allocation, while the bargaining set is re-
garded as stable bargaining outcomes. Thus, the inclusion of the Shapley value in the
bargaining set implies that the fair allocation can be realized as a stable bargaining
outcome. Watanabe and Tauman (2003) showed, however, that the Shapley value
of their patent licensing game is not in the bargaining set when the linear Cournot
market is very large.
In this subsection, we reexamine the relationship of those solutions for a coalition
structure in our model considering the practical situation. Aumann and Drµeze (1974)
de¯ned the Shapley value for a coalition structure (as well as other solutions) and
provided a set of axioms that characterizes the value. So, we hereafter call it the
Aumann-Drµeze value.
Let 'Sn(2 Rn+1) denote the Aumann-Drµeze value of our bargaining game with a
coalition structure PSn . Let sn = jSnj and t = jT j for T µ Sn. The Aumann-Drµeze
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value 'Sn0 for the patent holder is represented by
'Sn0 =
X
TµSn
t!(sn ¡ t)!
(sn + 1)!
(v(f0g [ T )¡ v(T )):
There are sn!=(t!(sn ¡ t)!) orderings with the same marginal contribution v(f0g [
T ) ¡ v(T ) = t(W (t) ¡ L(n ¡ t)) of the patent holder because licensees in Sn are
identical. Thus, the Aumann-Drµeze value 'Sn0 of the patent holder is given by
'Sn0 =
1
sn + 1
snX
t=0
t(W (t)¡ L(n¡ t)):
By the axioms of relative e±ciency and symmetry (Aumann and Drµeze (1974)),
'Sni = (v(f0g [ Sn)¡ 'Sn0 )=sn for all i 2 Sn, and 'Snj = v(fjg) for all j 2 Nn n Sn.
The Aumann-Drµeze value is player i's average marginal contribution to coalitions
in the coalition to which i belongs under a coalition structure PSn , so it is interpreted
as representing a fair allocation.
Proposition 5. In the Cournot market, limn!1 'Sn0 < limn!1 snW (sn) for all
Sn ( Nn with limn!1 sn · K.
Proof. Let s = limn!1 sn. For any Tn such that Tn µ Nn, limn!1 tnL(n¡ tn) = 0,
by Lemma 1 (d). Thus, for any Sn such that T µ Sn,
lim
n!1'
S
0 = limn!1
1
sn + 1
snX
t=0
t(W (t)¡ L(n¡ t)) = 1
s+ 1
sX
t=0
lim
n!1 tW (t):
When s · K, limn!1 snW (sn) = s ¢Q(c)"=K, by Lemma 1 (a). So, for any t such
that t · s · K, limn!1 tW (t) · limn!1 snW (sn). Accordingly,
1
s+ 1
sX
t=0
lim
n!1 tW (t) ·
s
s+ 1
lim
n!1 snW (sn) < limn!1 snW (sn):
We brie°y refer to the case of limn!1 sn > K. For any tn such that tn ¸ K,
v(f0g [ Tn) = tnW (tn) decreases in tn, as shown at the beginning of the proof
of Lemma 3, so snW (sn) < tW (t) when K · t < sn. By an analogy to the
Cournot limit theorem applied to non-licensees (Lemma 1 (d)), if we could obtain
limn!1 tW (t) = limn!1 snW (sn), then it would be clearly that
lim
n!1
1
sn + 1
snX
t=1
tW (t) · lim
n!1
sn
sn + 1
snW (sn);
which plays an essential role in proving Proposition 5. Even if n tends to in¯nity,
however, t0W (t0) does not vary whenever K · t0, because n ¡ t0 non-licensees exit
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the market and so the number of ¯rms producing in the market does not change.
Consequently, we cannot necessarily obtain a clear relationship between these two
solutions when limn!1 sn > K.
As far as any Sn ( Nn with limn!1 sn · K, however, we found that the
Aumann-Drµeze value is not in the bargaining set for a coalition structure PSn in
a very large Cournot market. Proposition 1 and Lemma 3 suggest that, in such
a very large Cournot market, the patent holder chooses s¤n = K ¯rms at stage
(i). Therefore, we can say that the fair allocation cannot be realized as a stable
bargaining outcome.
Finally, let us compute the Aumann-Drµeze value when the patent holder nego-
tiates with s¤n ¯rms in a large Cournot market, to see how far the fair allocation is
from the stable bargaining outcome.
Proposition 6. In the Cournot market,
lim
n!1'
S¤n
0 =
"Q(c)
2
; lim
n!1'
S¤n
i =
"Q(c)
2K
if i 2 S¤n; and limn!1'
S¤n
j = 0 if j 2 Nn n S¤n:
Proof. By Lemma 3 (b), limn!1 s¤n = K. By Lemma 1 (a), for any t such that
t · K, limn!1 tW (t) = tQ(c)"=K. By Lemma 1 (d), limn!1 tL(n¡ t) = 0. Thus,
lim
n!1'
S¤n
0 = limn!1
1
s¤n + 1
s¤nX
t=0
t(W (t)¡ L(n¡ t)) = 1
K + 1
KX
t=1
"Q(c)t
K
=
"Q(c)
2
;
For all i 2 S¤n, because v(f0g [ S¤n) = s¤nW (s¤n),
lim
n!1'
S¤n
i = limn!1
s¤nW (s¤n)¡ 'S
¤
n
0
s¤n
=
"Q(c)
2K
:
For all j 2 Nn n S¤n,
lim
n!1'
S¤n
j = limn!1 v(fjg) = limn!1L(n¡ 1) = 0:
For a broad class of games, Wooders and Zame (1987) showed that the Shapley
value is in the ²-core and ² is very small if the game has in¯nitely many players, i.e.,
fair allocations are strongly stable in such large games.16 Proposition 6 indicates,
however, that the fair allocation is far from the stable bargaining outcome by as
16Kats and Tauman (1985) studied the asymptotic inclusion relationship of the Shapley value
in the core in replicated production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs, where only a
limited number of permitted ¯rms have access to a better production technology, assuming that
every ¯rm is a price taker.
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much as "Q(c)=2 from the patent holder's viewpoint when s¤n = K, so the di®erence
between the fair allocation and the stable outcome is not small.
In our patent licensing game, the patent holder acts as a big boss in the sense that
no ¯rm can use his patented technology without his permission and all non-licensees
incur disadvantage compared with licensees. As Lemma 1 (d) shows, on the other
hand, the bargaining power of objecting or counter-objecting coalitions of ¯rms is
(almost) nothing, when the number of ¯rms is large. Therefore, even an external
patent holder can extract the entire pro¯ts of licensees, although he can gain nothing
without licensing his patented technology. Our patent licensing game is not formu-
lated as a large game, but the existence of such a big boss is the essential point that
induces our asymptotic result on the Aumann-Drµeze (Shapley) value to be di®erent
from Wooders and Zame's result: They considered a class of games including pri-
vate exchange economies (with divisible and indivisible goods), coalition-production
economics, etc., where there is no such agent who plays a remarkably important role
like a big boss.17
4 Remarks on the related literature
4.1 The super-additivity
The characteristic function we de¯ned in Subsection 2.2 does not necessarily exhibit
super-additivity that is often presumed in the cooperative analysis. Super-additivity
is the feature of characteristic functions required in analyzing how to divide the
total payo® in the grand coalition, because the grand coalition may not actually
form without it. It would not be a pre-requisite in games where there is no need
for players to form the grand coalition. In fact, Aumann and Drµeze (1974) did not
require the super-additivity for analysis of games with coalition structures.
This paper prohibits ¯rms from forming any cartels in the market, because we
wished to consider the same situation as in the non-cooperative analysis in the liter-
ature. A coalition is thus regarded as merely a group within which communication
among its members is allowed. This is one of the reasons why our characteristic
function does not necessarily satisfy the super-additivity.18
17Muto et al. (1989) characterized many solutions and the relationship among them in a class
of games where there exists a big boss in the context of information trading. They required a
monotonicity for the characteristic function and did not have to take into account any coalition
structures. These are the major di®erences with our patent licensing games.
18Watanabe and Tauman (2003) proposed a sophisticated de¯nition of the characteristic function
under a subtle mixture of con°ict and cooperation. Tauman and Watanabe (2007) gave a simpler
interpretation to it. Their characteristic function satis¯es the super-additivity.
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4.2 The incumbent patent holder
In this paper, we considered the patent licensing problem with an external patent
holder. If the patent holder is also a producer, he is called an incumbent patent
holder. Wang (1998) showed that licensing by means of a per-unit royalty is better
than that by means of a ¯xed license fee for the incumbent patent holder in a
Cournot duopoly market. Kamien and Tauman (2002) extended his model to a
Cournot oligopoly market. With a general demand function and convex cost, Ino and
Kawamori (2009) examined whether or not a cost-reducing innovation is pro¯table
for the incumbent patent holder in a large oligopolistic market, and showed that a
partial-monopoly market, in which the incumbent patent holder chooses his output
as a price maker while the other ¯rms produce as price takers, arise when he does
not license his (non-drastic) patented technology. It is left for a future research to
study bargaining outcomes in the case of an incumbent patent holder.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let t ´ limn!1 tn. In the Cournot market, the following four statements
hold: (a) If t · K, then limn!1 tnW (tn) = t ¢ "Q(c)=K. (b) If t > K, then
limn!1 tnW (tn) = (c ¡ ")Q(p)=(t´(p) ¡ 1), where p = p(t). (c) If tn diverges,
then limn!1 tnW (tn) = 0. (d) Regardless of whether tn converges or diverges,
limn!1 tnL(n¡ tn) = 0.
Proof. (a) We ¯rst show that, for each tn such that t · K, limn!1 p(tn) = c. As
a general property, for su±ciently large n, the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(tn)
satis¯es
n(p¡ c) = p
´(p)
¡ tn" if tn · K; (5)
where tn is the number of licensees. (See, e.g., KOT.) As noted in Subsection 2.2,
for any tn with 0 · tn · n, the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(tn) decreases in tn
and p(K) = c, so c · p(tn) if 0 · tn · K. By A2, ´(p) is non-decreasing in p. Thus,
´(c) · ´(p(tn)) whenever 0 · tn · K. Accordingly, by (5),
n(p¡ c) = p
´(p)
¡ tn" · p
´(c)
¡ tn";
i.e.,
c · p(tn) ·
µ
c¡ tn"
n
¶.µ
1¡ 1
n´(c)
¶
if tn · K:
Con¯rm that
lim
n!1
µ
c¡ tn"
n
¶.µ
1¡ 1
n´(c)
¶
= c:
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Therefore, for each tn with t · K,
lim
n!1 p(tn) = c; (6)
by the squeeze theorem.
Let us give the proof of Lemma 1 (a). When tn · K, by ´(p) = ¡pQ0=Q and
Q0 = 1=P 0 (i.e., dQ=dp = 1=(dP=dq)), (5) is rewritten as np + P 0Q(p) = nc ¡ tn".
Thus, by (1),
tnW (tn) = ¡ tn(p¡ c+ ")
2
P 0
=
tnQ(p)(p¡ c+ ")2
n(p¡ c) + tn"
=
tnQ(p)(p¡ c)2
n(p¡ c) + tn" +
2tnQ(p)(p¡ c)"
n(p¡ c) + tn" +
tnQ(p)"2
n(p¡ c) + tn";
where p = p(tn) is the Cournot equilibrium price. By (6), limn!1 p(tn) = c. Note
that, by (5),
lim
n!1n(p¡ c) = limn!1
µ
p
´(p)
¡ tn"
¶
=
c
´(c)
¡ t" = " (K ¡ t) :
Thus, by 0 < " <1,
lim
n!1 tnW (tn) = limn!1
tnQ(p)"2
n(p¡ c) + tn" = t ¢
Q(c)"
K
:
(b) Let n be such that, for all n0 ¸ n, tn0 = t. Because the Cournot equilibrium
price p(tn) decreases in tn and p(K) = c, p(tn) < c if tn > K. Then, only tn ¯rms
produce in the market and n ¡ tn ¯rms exit the market. As noted in the proof of
Lemma 3 (a), the Cournot equilibrium price p = p(tn) satis¯es
p = (c¡ ")
.µ
1¡ 1
tn´(p)
¶
; (7)
when tn > K. (7) does not depend on n because tn = t(> K) and only t ¯rms
produce in the market. Thus,
lim
n!1 tnW (tn) = limn!1 tn ¢
(p¡ c+ ")Q(p)
tn
= (p¡ c+ ")Q(p) = (c¡ ")Q(p)
t´(p)¡ 1 ;
where p = p(tn) = p(t).
(c) We show that limn!1 p(tn) = c¡ " if tn diverges. Let tn > K and p = p(tn).
As shown in Lemma 1 (b), p(tn) < c if tn > K, so
1¡ 1
tn´(p)
· 1¡ 1
tn´(c)
= 1¡ "K
tnc
· 1; (8)
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because ´(c) ¸ ´(p), tn ¸ 1 and K = c="´(c) > 1. By a general property of
the Cournot equilibrium price that (7) holds if tn > K and (8), p(tn) ¸ c ¡ ".
Furthermore, ´(p) ¸ ´(c¡ ") because ´(p) is non-decreasing in p, so
p = (c¡ ")
.µ
1¡ 1
tn´(p)
¶
· (c¡ ")
.µ
1¡ 1
tn´(c¡ ")
¶
:
When tn diverges to in¯nity,
lim
n!1(c¡ ")
.µ
1¡ 1
tn´(c¡ ")
¶
= c¡ ";
which implies limn!1 p(tn) = c¡ " by the squeeze theorem. Then,
lim
n!1 tnW (tn) = limn!1 tn ¢
(p¡ c+ ")Q(p)
tn
= (c¡ "¡ c+ ")Q(c¡ ") = 0:
(d) Consider the total Cournot equilibrium pro¯t of tn non-licensees. Then,
there are n ¡ tn licensees. If n ¡ tn > K, tnL(n ¡ tn) = 0, by (3). Hence, when
n ¡ tn diverges or converges to more than K, limn!1 tnL(n ¡ tn) = 0. When
limn!1(n¡ tn) · K, for su±ciently large n, (5) is rewritten as
n(p¡ c) = p
´(p)
¡ (n¡ tn)"; (9)
where p = p(n¡ tn) and n¡ tn is the number of licensees. By ´(p) = ¡pQ0=Q and
Q0 = 1=P 0 (i.e., dQ=dp = 1=(dP=dq)), (9) is rewritten as
np+ P 0Q(p) = nc¡ (n¡ tn)"; (10)
If n¡ tn · K, by (2), (9) and (10),
tnL(n¡ tn) = ¡ tn(p¡ c)
2
P 0
=
tnQ(p)(p¡ c)2
n(p¡ c) + (n¡ tn)"
=
tn´(p)Q(p)
p
¢
µ
p¡ ´(p)(n¡ tn)"
n´(p)
¶2
=
tn´(p)Q(p)
n2p
¢
Ãµ
p
´(p)
¶2
¡ 2(n¡ tn)
µ
p
´(p)
¶
"+ (n¡ tn)2"2
!
· tn
n
¢ ´(p)Q(p)
p
¢
Ã
1
n
µ
p
´(p)
¶2
¡ 2
µ
1¡ tn
n
¶µ
p
´(p)
¶
"+
K2"2
n
!
;
where p = p(n ¡ tn) is the Cournot equilibrium price. By (6), limn!1 p(n ¡ tn) =
c, where n ¡ tn is the number of licensees. Note that limn!1 tn=n = 1 because
(n¡K)=n · tn=n · 1. Thus, by 0 < " < c,
lim
n!1
"
tn
n
¢ ´(p)Q(p)
p
¢
Ã
1
n
µ
p
´(p)
¶2
¡ 2
µ
1¡ tn
n
¶µ
p
´(p)
¶
"+
K2"2
n
!#
= 0:
Because 0 · tnL(n¡ tn), limn!1 tnL(n¡ tn) = 0, by the squeeze theorem.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Let s0n be such that s0nW (s0n) ¸ snW (sn) for sn = 1; : : : ; n. Then,
limn!1 s0n = K.
Proof. For any tn such that limn!1 tn · K, limn!1 tnW (tn) = (limn!1 tn) ¢
Q(c)"=K, by Lemma 1 (a). Thus,³
lim
n!1 tn
´
¢ Q(c)"
K
· "Q(c) = lim
n!1KW (K):
For each tn with tn ¸ K, tnW (tn) decreases in tn, as shown at the beginning of
the proof of Lemma 3, and if tn diverges or converges to more than K, "Q(c) 6=
limn!1 tnW (tn) by Lemmas 1 (b) and (c). Therefore, the number of licensees that
maximizes tnW (tn) becomes K as n tends to in¯nity.
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